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Abstract
We develop a macroeconomic model where the government does not guarantee to repay
debt. We ask whether movements in the prices of government bonds can be rationalized
by lenders unwillingness to roll over debt when the outstanding debt level exceeds a
governments repayment capacity. Default occurs if a worsening state of the economy
leads to a build-up of debt that exceeds the governments ability to repay. Investors
are unwilling to engage in a Ponzi game and withdraw lending in this case and thus
force default at an endogenously determined fractional repayment rate. Interest rates on
government bonds reect expectations of this event. We analytically show that there exist
two equilibrium bond prices. Our numerical analysis shows that, at moderate debt-to-gdp
levels, default premia hardly emerge in the low risk equilibrium. High risk premia can
either arise at high debt-to-gdp ratios, where even small changes in fundamentals lead to
steeply rising interest rates, or as realizations of the high risk equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
The recent nancial crisis has turned into a scal crisis in several European countries. An
unusually large adverse shock has reduced tax revenues and has led to higher government
spending in an attempt to mitigate the consequences of the shock for aggregate output and
employment. The resulting boost in public decits has produced unprecedented levels of
government debt, which are already above 100% of annual gdp in some countries and are
predicted to rise to even higher levels in the near future. Sizeable yield spreads between
government bonds of member countries of the European Monetary Union have emerged
and for some countries (in particular for Greece, Ireland, and Portugal) yield spreads in
relation to comparatively safe German bonds increased dramatically since 2008.
It is hardly controversial that these spreads reect the risk that governments might
default on their debt obligations. The purpose of the present paper is to analyze the
emergence of default risk premia on government bonds in a general equilibrium context. In
the literature, a common approach is to determine default as an outcome of an optimizing
sovereign borrower who is willing to default if the gains from non-repayment of external
debt exceed the costs of autarky and potential resource losses in case of default (see Eaton
and Gersovitz, 1981, or Arellano, 2008, among others). In contrast to this, we consider
an alternative approach where default is initiated by the decision of lenders to withdraw
nancing of the government when outstanding public debt exceeds the governments debt
repayment capacity. The focus on the lender side of the credit relationship allows us to
remain agnostic with respect to the sovereign borrowers objectives and, in particular, its
incentives to default.
A governments debt repayment capacity equals the maximum present value of govern-
ment surpluses, such that its ability to raise future revenues is essential for the probability
of default.3 Lendersexpectations about the governments future surpluses are therefore
decisive for the premia they demand as a compensation for the risk of sovereign default.
We show analytically that this set-up can give rise to multiple bond market equilibria,
such that changes in bond prices can in principle be driven by self-fullling expectations.
If, for example, default is expected to be very likely, lenders demand a high interest rate
premium to be compensated for default risk, which raises the debt burden even more such
that the probability of default actually increases.
We apply a dynamic general equilibrium framework and consider a government with
limited commitment. It levies an exogenously determined proportional tax on labor in-
3This approach is similar to Bi (2012) and Bi and Leeper (2012) where default also depends on whether
current outstanding debt exceeds a "scal limit", which consists of the discouted sum of future maximum
surpluses.
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come and issues non-state contingent one-period bonds to nance a given stream of real
government expenditures, while failing to guarantee repayment of debt. If an adverse
productivity shock makes the present value of future surpluses fall short of covering the
level of outstanding debt, even if the surplus maximizing tax rate (which is well dened
due to a tax La¤er curve with an interior maximum) were levied for the entire future,
the governments debt repayment capacity is exceeded. A potential household-lender who
realizes that he would support a Ponzi game if he invested in government bonds is assumed
to stop lending to the government. In this case, default becomes inevitable and available
funds are distributed to bond holders, who therefore experience only a partial redemption
of their investments at an endogenously determined rate. Each individual lender assesses
the probability that this event will occur in the next period and, consequently, demands a
default risk premium as a compensation for expected losses. Given that lenders can seize
current net revenues from the government in the case of default (a situation that di¤ers
from credit relations where the lender may become a claimant on future prot streams),
government bonds are then priced like standard debt contracts with limited liability.
We neither consider governmentsincentives to default on external debt nor real costs
of default, which might cause governments to raise surpluses that preclude costly defaults.
Instead, the essence of the analysis is to explore the impact of a potential lending boycott
on equilibrium risk premia and bond prices. To isolate the implications of this approach in
the most transparent way and to show analytically how multiple bond market equilibria
can arise, we assume that tax rates and government spending are constant (like in the
literature on the scal theory of price level, see Sims, 1994, and Woodford, 1994, or on
the scal theory of sovereign default, see Uribe, 2006). These simplifying assumptions
obviously come at the cost that we may underestimate the full impact of scal policy on
default probabilities to the extent that in reality governments behave in a less mechanical
way.
The main results are as follows. We show that there may exist multiple equilibrium
prices for government debt. In particular, two bond prices can exist in equilibrium: both
a combination of a low price (a high interest rate), high default risk, and high public debt,
as well as one of a high price (a low interest rate), low default risk, and low public debt are
compatible with the expected rate of return of investors and with the governments demand
for external funds.4 Default is likely to occur if the lenders coordinate their expectations
on the high risk equilibrium, thereby imposing an unsustainable nancing burden on the
government through high risk premia in the period of maturity. If we focus on the lower
4The existence of two equilibrium bond prices relates to Calvo (1988), who also considers sovereign
default and shows that two equilibria (with high and low interest rates) can exist.
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of the equilibrium interest rates, we nd that default premia are monotonically increasing
in the initial debt level and depend negatively on productivity. We show that the relation
between the debt-to-gdp ratio and the default risk premium can be very steep above certain
critical levels of debt-to-gdp, consistent with the observation that risk premia may rise
suddenly and very strongly when scal positions worsen. In a calibrated version intended
to capture relevant quantitative features of average European Monetary Union member
countries in a stylized way, non-negligible interest rate spreads emerge only for very high
levels of debt in the neighborhood of 200% of gdp. Thus, for the average Eurozone country
the model predicts that scal spare capacity is ample and, consequently, that risk premia
are negligible at observed debt-to-gdp levels, which is consistent with empirical evidence
for countries such as France, Germany, or the Netherlands. The emergence of high risk
premia observed in other countries can be rationalized in the context of the calibrated
model in either of two ways: rst, default expectations may be self-fullling and lead to
the high interest rate equilibrium; second, the relevant maximum debt capacity may be
much lower than the one used in our baseline model if investors believe that the maximum
politically feasible tax rate (which we do not model explicitly) is lower than the surplus
maximizing tax rate.
Our approach to model sovereign default is related to Uribes (2006) "Fiscal Theory of
Sovereign Default". He considers nominal debt and exogenous surpluses in an endowment
economy to demonstrate that default is inevitable under certain monetary-scal policy
regimes. Our strategy to determine default di¤ers substantially from his approach. As
shown in Schabert (2010), the intertemporal budget constraint is neither su¢ cient as a
criterion to determine the default rate, i.e. the fractional rate of repayment of outstanding
debt in the case of default, nor the interest rate on risky bonds. For the case which is
most closely related to our set-up, Uribe (2006) introduces an additional "scal policy
constraint restricting the behavior of the default rate" (p. 1869), which allows to uniquely
determine the equilibrium interest rate. In the present paper, in contrast, we instead
introduce the assumptions of a sudden lending stop in the case where a Ponzi-game of
the government becomes inevitable and that the government serves lenders with current
surpluses, which allows us to endogenously determine an entire sequence of default rates
without any additional restriction on the governments behavior.5 This is an aspect which
di¤ers from Bi (2012), where default can in principle occur in every state and at every
debt level (though with di¤erent probabilities). In contrast to our approach, in her paper
default depends on a random draw from a scal limit distribution that induces default if it
5Without such an assumption or Uribes (2006) scal closing rules (like a rule whereby the govern-
ment decides to default if the tax-to-debt ratio falls below a certain threshold), default rates can only be
determined in the initial period, as shown in Schabert (2010).
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exceeds the current debt level, while the particular default rate is exogenously determined
through a draw from a historical default rate distribution.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3.1 de-
scribes the determination of equilibrium bond prices in a simplied version where analytical
results are available, whereupon section 3.2 presents quantitative results for a calibrated
model version. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
In this section, we present a simple real dynamic general equilibrium model where the
government levies income taxes and issues non-state contingent one period debt. Labor
supply is endogenous, which gives rise to a La¤er curve that bounds equilibrium tax
revenues. We consider the case where scal policy does not guarantee that the government
never runs a Ponzi-game.6 Individual households will stop lending to the government
when they realize that a Ponzi scheme is inevitable. Without further access to credit,
the government then defaults while lenders can seize current net revenues. Households
rationally consider that this event is possible when adverse productivity shocks lead to a
build-up of public debt. They form expectations of the future fractional rate of repayment
of government debt. Accordingly, in an arbitrage-free equilibrium, risk premia exist that
compensate household-lenders for the risk of government default.
2.1 The private sector
There exists a continuum of innitely lived and identical households of mass one. Their
utility increases in consumption ct and decreases in working time lt, the latter variable
being bounded by a unit time endowment such that lt 2 (0; 1). The objective of a repres-
entative household is given by
maxEs
1X
t=0
t

ln ct+s +
1  lt+s


; with  2 (0; 1);  > 0, (1)
where  denotes the subjective discount factor. Households borrow and lend among each
other via one-period private debt contracts. Private debt is introduced here to dene
a risk-free interest rate Rrft . Let dt 1 denote the beginning of period net private asset
position and 1=Rrft the period-t-price for a payo¤ of one unit of output in period t + 1.
We restrict our attention to the case where private debt contracts are enforceable and
6This assumption is analogous to the scal policy specication in Uribe (2006) and in the scal theory
of the price level (see Sims, 1994, and Woodford, 1994). In contrast to these studies, in our purely real
model the price level is irrelevant.
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households satisfy the borrowing constraint
lim
t!1

dt+s=R
rf
t+s
 tY
i=1
1=Rrfs+i 1  0: (2)
Utility maximization subject to the borrowing constraint (2) requires the following rst
order condition for borrowing and lending in terms of private debt (i.e. the consumption
Euler equation) to be satised,
c 1t = R
rf
t Et
 
c 1t+1

; (3)
as well as the transversality condition
lim
t!1Es

dt+s=R
rf
t+s
 tY
i=1
1=Rrfs+i 1 = 0. (4)
Households can further invest in one-period government bonds bt, subject to b 1 > 0 and
bt  0. The government o¤ers one-period debt contracts at the price 1=Rt in period t that
promise to deliver one unit of output in period t+1. In contrast to private borrowers, the
government does not guarantee full debt repayment. In case of default, the lenders will
proportionally be served out of current net revenues. Hence, we assume limited liability
in the sense that the lenders have no claims to future surpluses.
If current and discounted future surpluses are expected to be large enough to repay
outstanding debt, the household optimality condition for investment in government bonds
is the analogue to the Euler equation (3), namely, c 1t = RtEt
 
c 1t+1

. The constraint
bt  0 further requires that in the household optimum the transversality condition
lim
t!1Es (bt+s=Rt+s)
tY
i=1
1=Rrfs+i 1 = 0; (5)
holds, where Rt+s = R
rf
t+s when the government fully services its debt obligations. If
beginning-of-period public debt exceeds a level that is too high to be repayable even for
the maximum present value of budget surpluses (see section 2.2 for a denition), the
government runs into a Ponzi game, which would be inconsistent with the households
transversality condition (5). In this case, households are assumed to stop lending to the
government, which necessarily implies that the government defaults in period t, i.e. can
honor only a fraction of its debt obligations out of current surpluses. Note that we neglect
the possibility that the default rate can be reduced if individual households coordinate
their period t lending in a way that the government can roll over debt to an amount that
is repayable.
Since households are assumed to have rational expectations, they realize the possibility
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of partial default on government bonds and account for the probability of default (of course,
since households are atomistic, an individual investor does not take into consideration the
inuence of his behavior on the probability of default). Let 1   t denote the fraction of
government bonds that is redeemed and t the default rate. The household ow budget
constraint then reads
ct + (bt=Rt) +

dt=R
rf
t

 (1   t)wtlt + (1  t) bt 1 + dt 1 + t;
where t are rmsprots and labor income wtlt (with the real wage rate wt) is subject
to a proportional tax rate  t 2 (0; 1). For simplicity, we neglect non-negative lump-sum
government transfers, by which the government redistributes resources when current debt
is lower than the present value of future surpluses. Assuming that these transfers will be
paid at some random point in the future, we can abstract from them in the remainder of
the analysis (see Aiyagari et al., 2002, for a similar assumption). The household optimum
is characterized by the rst order conditions (3),
ct=  (1   t)wt; (6)
c 1t =RtEt
 
c 1t+1 (1  t+1)

; (7)
and the transversality conditions (4) and (5). Note that the Euler equation for risky
government debt, (7), di¤ers from the one for risk-free private debt (3), in that the pricing
of government bonds is a¤ected by the fact that repayment is expected to be only partial
because of possible future default.
Perfectly competitive rms produce the output good yt with a simple linear technology
yt = atlt; (8)
where labor productivity at is generated by a stationary process with mean a = 1. Labor
demand satises
wt = at: (9)
2.2 The public sector
The government does not have access to lump-sum taxation and does not guarantee full
debt repayment. It raises revenues by issuing debt at price qt and taxing labor income, and
it purchases an exogenously given amount gt of the nal good in each period. Throughout,
we assume government spending to be constant, gt = g > 0. The underlying assumption is
that political constraints make a certain amount of government spending inevitable. The
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ow budget constraint is given by
btR
 1
t + st = (1  t) bt 1; (10)
where Rt = 1=qt is the gross real interest rate and the surpluses st equal tax revenues net
of expenditures,
st =  twtlt   g: (11)
We assume that the government does not guarantee to fully service debt and does not
preclude that public debt might evolve on a path that implies a Ponzi scheme. Since
households are not willing to engage in such schemes, they may stop lending and (tem-
porarily) disrupt the government from access to credit.
To see this, consider, for a moment, the default free case, i.e. presume the non-
repayment rate t+k were equal to zero for all k  0. In this case, one would obtain
by iterating the government ow budget constraint (10) forward and taking expectations,
t+k = 0 8k  0)
bt 1 = Et
1X
k=0
st+k
kY
i=1
(1=Rt+i 1) + lim
k!1
Etbt+kR
 1
t+k
kY
i=1
1
Rt+i 1
: (12)
Now suppose that outstanding debt at the beginning of period t, bt 1, exceeds the present
value of future surpluses, i.e. the rst term on the right-hand side of (12). Then, the
limit term would exceed zero, limk!1Etbt+kR 1t+k
Qk
i=1 1=Rt+i 1 > 0. By denition, the
government would then run into a Ponzi game. But this, together with Rt+k = R
rf
t+k
8k  0 for t+k = 0 (see 3 and 7) would be inconsistent with the householdstransversality
condition (5). Given that households will then stop lending to the government, end-of-
period debt equals zero, bt = 0. The only way for the government budget constraint (10)
to be satised in this case is through default, which endogenously determines t > 0 (see
below, 15).
As a specic way to implement a scal policy that entails default risk in this sense,
we assume that the government keeps the tax rate constant,  t =  . This is a prominent
example of a large class of scal rules that do not incorporate enough self-corrective
behavior on the part of the government as to avoid Ponzi schemes in each period of time.
In principle, the government could always prevent default by cutting spending or raising
tax rates. If this possibility were deemed credible by private market participants, there
would be no default risk and observed risk premia could not be explained. Therefore,
we use the assumptions of constant government spending and tax rates as a simple way
to implement the idea that governments may not be willing or exible enough, probably
due to political pressures, to adjust spending quickly enough as to eliminate the risk that
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deteriorating business cycle conditions engender unstable debt dynamics.7
There exists a maximum value for the present value of future surpluses, which we call
the maximum debt repayment capacity. The latter is the maximum amount of debt that
the government would be able to repay if it imposed the surplus maximizing tax rate for
the entire future. A well dened surplus maximizing tax rate, t , exists because with
proportional labor income taxation there is a tax La¤er curve with an interior maximum
(see page 11 for details). We denote the period t value of the maximum debt repayment
capacity by 	t, dened as
	t = Et
1X
k=0
st+k
kY
i=1
1=Rrft+i 1: (13)
Here, st+k = 

tw

t+kl

t+k  g is the maximum period surplus that is obtained if the surplus
maximizing tax rate t is applied. This leads to corresponding levels of labor income
denoted wt+kl

t+k and the risk-free rate R
rf
t+k is applied for discounting.
8 When households
lend to the government, they take the maximum debt repayment capacity into account. We
thereby allow for the case where the current tax rate di¤ers from the surplus maximizing
tax rate, which could in principle be implemented by future governments.
The maximum initial debt level that can be expected to be repaid without default
is thus characterized by bt 1 = 	t. The government will fully serve debt obligations if
bt 1  	t. As long as this is the case, no government default occurs. Default, however,
becomes inevitable if the current stock of debt exceeds the maximum repayment capacity:
bt 1 > 	t: (14)
If this is the case, the government is not able to generate enough current and future
revenues to enable full repayment of outstanding debt.
In the case where (14) is satised, (12) with Rt+k = R
rf
t+k 8k  0 is inconsistent
7A constant tax rate can further be seen as a natural benchmark in this framework: if government
bonds were state contingent, it is well-established that in this type of model an optimal income tax rate
under commitment (and without default) would have to be constant and su¢ ciently large to nance initial
outstanding debt and future expenditures (see e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004). Here, government bonds
are however non-state contingent, which implies that this type of tax policy is in general not consistent
with a set of "measurability constraints" for each period that relate the present value of future surpluses
to the beginning-of-period stock of public debt to rule out Ponzi games (see Ayiagari et al., 2002). The
choice of a constant tax rate can thus be viewed as the strategy of a government that ignores this subtle
di¤erence and sets the tax rate as if debt were state contingent.
8Note that the maximum debt repayment capacity bears a resemblance to Aiyagaris (1994) natural
debt limit for consumers. Private households cannot accumulate more debt than would be expected to
be repaid by pledging the entire stream of future incomes. While households are assumed to respect the
natural private debt limit (as a borrowing constraint) for their plans, the government sets its instruments
without internalizing the maximum debt repayment capacity, which is why default may occasionally occur
in our model.
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with the transversality condition (5) and no individual household is willing to lend to
the government. The consequence is that aggregate lending to the government comes
to a halt, such that end-of-period debt equals zero, bt = 0, in the current period. The
government is then unable to fully honor its obligations and redeems as much as possible
of its outstanding debt out of current surpluses. As a consequence, repayment will only
be partial. The non-repayment or default rate t for the case (14) satises (see 10)
t = 1  st=bt 1: (15)
To sum up, if beginning-of-period debt bt 1 is smaller than 	t, households are willing
to lend to the government according to (7), while the government does not default in
period t, t = 0, and borrows to balance its budget such that end-of-period debt equals
bt = (bt 1   st)Rt. The price of debt, 1=Rt, then reects the probability of default in t+1.
If, however, beginning-of-period debt is too high such that (14) is satised, households stop
lending. The government defaults and repays debt, with a default rate given by (15). In
the period subsequent to a default event, the stock of government debt is zero and default
is not possible in the next period, such that households are again willing to lend to the
government. As mentioned above, we assume that the government transfers back resources
in some future period, which guarantees that the intertemporal budget constraint will be
satised in all periods (see Aiyagari et al., 2002).
2.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, prices adjust to clear markets for goods, labor, and assets and the net stock
of risk-free private debt dt is zero in the aggregate. Householdsinitial asset endowments
are assumed to be positive, i.e. the government is initially indebted. An equilibrium is a
set of sequences fct; lt 2 [0; 1]; yt; wt, bt  0, t 2 [0; 1]; Rrft , Rt; stg1t=0 satisfying (3)-(6),
(7), (8), (9), (11), (13), and
yt= ct + gt; (16)
bt=
(
(bt 1   st)Rt if 	t  bt 1
0 if 	t < bt 1
; (17)
t=
(
0 if 	t  bt 1
1  st=bt 1 if 	t < bt 1
, (18)
a scal policy setting  2 [0; 1], given fatg1t=0, g > 0, and initial debt b 1 > 0.
The equilibrium allocation is not directly a¤ected by public debt and the (expected)
default rate. The rst property is due to the fact that the current labor income tax rate
is assumed not to be state contingent. The second property follows from the fact that
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default does not lead to resource losses or distortions. Of course, the price of government
bonds will depend on the expected default rate, which can be seen from the asset pricing
equation (7). This reection of the probability of future default in the interest rate on
government bonds is our main object of study.
The equilibrium sequences of consumption, working time, output, the wage rate, the
risk-free rate and government surpluses fct; lt; yt; wt, Rrft , stg1t=0 are determined for given
g and fatg1t=0 by (6), (8), (9), (11) and (16), which can be summarized by
ct= c (at; ) :=  (1  ) at; (19)
lt= l (at; ) := (c (at; ) + g) =at; (20)
st= s (at; ) := c (at; )  (1  )g; (21)
Rrft = c (at; )
 1  1=Et

c (at+1; )
 1

; (22)
as well as wt = at and yt = atl (at; ).9
While the equilibrium sequences fct; lt; yt; wt, stg1t=0 are not a¤ected by sovereign
default, these variables are of course correlated with the default rate t due to changes
in the state at. In any case, they will be stationary, given that the state at is stationary.
With the above solutions, we can compute the surplus maximizing tax rate t 2 (0; 1),
which depends on the state of the business cycle at. Using the solutions (19)-(21), we
can identify a time-varying tax rate t 2 (0; 1) that maximizes government surpluses
st =  t (1   t) at   (1   t)g. This state contingent tax rate can immediately be shown
to be unique and to satisfy t = (at) with (at) =
1
2 +
g
2at
.
In order to determine the bond prices we need to compute expectations about future
defaults. We substitute out the risk-free rate in (13), to get 	t = Et
P1
k=0 
k c
 1
t+k
c 1t
st+k,
and rewrite it by using the solutions (19) and (21):
	t =  (1  t ) atEt
1X
k=0
k

t+k   a 1t+k 1g

: (23)
The expected default rate, public debt, and the bond price have to be determined simul-
taneously using the equilibrium conditions (7), (17), and (18). In order to identify these
solutions, we have to consider the probabilities of the two distinct cases 	t  bt 1 and
	t < bt 1.
Let at be the productivity level that leads to a maximum debt repayment capacity 	t
9 If default occurs (t = 1   st=bt 1) the budget constraints imply ct = (1    t)wtlt + (1  t) bt 1 =
(1   t)wtlt + st and thus yt = atlt = ct + g.
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that exactly equals beginning-of-period debt bt 1,
at : 	 (a

t ) = bt 1: (24)
Thus, at is the minimum productivity level that allows full debt repayment and thus pre-
cludes default; we will refer to this as the productivity threshold. Further, let t (at+1) =
 (at+1jat) be the probability of a particular value at+1 conditional on at. Then, the
probabilities of default and of non-default in t+ 1 conditional on the information in t are
prob (	t+1 < btjat; bt) =
Z at+1
 1
t (at+1) dat+1;
prob (	t+1  btjat; bt) =
Z 1
at+1
t (at+1) dat+1:
These probabilities can be used to rewrite the asset pricing equation (7), which includes the
expectation term Et

c 1t+1 (1  t+1)

, where we account for the possibility that consump-
tion and the default rate are not independent. According to the assumptions in section
2.2, the default rate t+1 equals zero if 	t+1  bt, and t+1 = 1   st+1=bt if 	t+1 < bt.
Hence, Et

c 1t+1 (1  t+1)

is given by
Et

c 1t+1 (1  t+1)

=
Z at+1
 1
t (at+1)

c 1t+1  (st+1=bt)

dat+1 +
Z 1
at+1
t (at+1)

c 1t+1  (1  0)

dat+1:
Using the solutions (19) and (21), the asset pricing equation (7) can thus be written as
1=Rt =

c 1t
24b 1t R at+1 1 t (at+1) hc (at+1; ) 1 s (at+1; )i dat+1
+
R1
at+1
t (at+1)
h
c (at+1; )
 1
i
dat+1
35 : (25)
Risk premia can then be computed as follows (further details can be found in appendix
A.2): At the beginning of period t, bt 1 is known and the stochastic productivity level
at realizes. We get solutions fct,stg from (19) and (21). Then, we can compute the
maximum debt repayment capacity using (23), where the conditional expectation in (23)
is calculated using a discrete transition probability matrix for productivity. If 	t < bt 1,
the government defaults, while bonds are not traded. For 	t  bt 1, the government does
not default in period t. The bond price 1=Rt, end-of-period debt bt, and the productivity
threshold at+1 then simultaneously solve (25), the updated version of (24) which reads
bt = 	
 
at+1

, and the governments ow budget identity
bt=Rt = bt 1   st. (26)
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After the equilibrium bond price 1=Rt is derived, we compute the sovereign risk premium
Rt  Rrft (using 22).
3 Results
3.1 Multiple bond market equilibria
In this section, we examine the determination of bond prices and show analytically that
multiple equilibrium bond prices can exist. To be able to derive analytical results, we
apply a simplied version of the model. We assume that at is a serially uncorrelated
random draw from the uniform distribution with support [al; ah] where al and ah are
positive constants. To further simplify the derivation of analytical results, we assume
that only the rst-order terms of the maximum debt capacity (23) are non-negligible,
and that the surplus maximizing tax rate is constant and equals the maximizer of the
surplus maximizing tax rate for average productivity,  = 12 +
g
2a . We further restrict
our attention to the upward sloping part of the La¤er curve,   .
With these assumptions, consumption, surpluses, and maximum repayable debt are
linear functions of the current exogenous state at:
	(at) = (1  ) (at   g) + (1  ) at 
1   (
   (1=a) g) ; (27)
c (at) =  (1  ) at = 2at; (28)
s (at) = (1  ) at   (1  ) g = 3at   4; (29)
where in each line the second equality sign denes the composite parameters 2;3;4 > 0.
Further, end-of-period debt satises bt = 	
 
at+1

(see 24) and the government budget
(26) demands 1=Rt = (bt 1   st) =bt = (bt 1   3at + 4) =	
 
at+1

. The asset pricing
equation (25) can then be written as
1=Rt = at
8<:	
 
at+1
 1 h
3
R at+1
al
 (at+1) dat+1   4
R at+1
al
 (at+1) (1=at+1) dat+1
i
+
R ah
at+1
 (at+1) (1=at+1) dat+1
9=; :
With uniformly distributed productivity levels, this simplies to
1=Rt = 
at
ah   al
(
3
 
at+1   al
  4  log at+1   log al
	
 
at+1
 +  log ah   log at+1
)
: (30)
Thus, condition (30), which can be interpreted as a credit supply condition, describes
the bond price 1=Rt = qt as a function of end-of-period debt bt = 	
 
at+1

for a given
exogenous state at.
The governments demand for credit is described by the period budget constraint (26),
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which reads bt=Rt = (bt 1   st) :Using (29) it can be written as 1=Rt = (bt 1   3at + 4) =bt ,
1=Rt = (bt 1   3at + 4) =	
 
at+1

: (31)
Credit supply (30) and demand (31) provide two conditions that determine the price 1=Rt
and the quantity of debt bt = 	
 
at+1

issued in period t. It can be shown that there are
either a unique, no, or two equilibrium bond prices, which is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose that productivity is uniformly distributed with at 2 [al; ah] and
credit demand exceeds a level below which debt is risk-free, bt 1   st > 	(al) =Rrft .
1. There exists a unique equilibrium if credit demand satises bt 1   st  
1;t, where

1;t  at (1  )    (1=Rrft ) (1  ) g.
2. For 
1;t < bt 1   st, two equilibria exist if (but not only if) bt 1   st  
2;t, where

2;t  at 1ah al f(1  ) 
 
ahe
 (al)   al
 (1  ) g log(ah=al)+ (ah) [(1  ) g+
	
 
ahe
 (al)]g and  as dened in (36, see appendix A.1).
Proof. See appendix A.1.
Credit demand (31) implies end-of-period debt to be proportional to the interest rate for
a given stock of debt at the beginning-of-period bt 1 and the exogenous state at, which
reects the fact that the government has to issue more bonds bt if the price qt is lower, or,
the interest rate Rt = 1=qt is higher. At the same time, credit supply (30) also implies a
positive relation between bt and Rt, since future surpluses that su¢ ce to repay debt become
less likely for higher thresholds at+1 (= 	 1(bt)). This tends to reduce the expected return
from bonds (since it increases the probability of default) and induces investors to demand
a higher risk premium as a compensation. Yet, with higher end-of-period debt levels the
risk premium and, thus, the interest rate increase more than proportionally. Due to this
feedback mechanism, there might exist more than one bond market equilibrium, which is
more likely when credit demand is larger, i.e. if 
1;t < bt 1   st. In fact, we nd that the
latter condition is likely to be satised for reasonable parameter values, such that there
are typically two bond market equilibria. When credit demand is extremely large, there
exists no equilibrium, which can be ruled out if (but not only if) credit demand satises
bt 1   st < 
2;t. Hence, depending on how investors coordinate their expectations, a high
or a low equilibrium bond price can be realized and self-fullling default expectations are
possible. This result is, for example, similar to the outcome in Calvos (1988) two period
model, where the government might voluntarily default on its debt and two equilibria
(with high and low interest rates) can exist.
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Figure 1: Multiple bond market equilibria (uniformly distributed productivity shocks)
To illustrate the determination of equilibrium bond prices qt = 1=Rt and the potential
non-uniqueness of equilibria, we apply the parameter values  = 0:95;  = 2=3 (and thus
l(a) = 1=3), and g=y(a) = 0:2, while we consider alternative values for the tax rate  2
f0:2, 0:4, 0:55g and di¤erent values for the debt-to-gdp ratio bt 1=yt to examine equilibrium
properties and comparative statics. We assume that the uniform distribution for the
productivity level is characterized by al = 0:01 and ah = 1:99. These parameter values are
merely illustrative examples; see the next section for a parameterization intended to match
certain characteristics of European data in the context of a more realistic specication of
the process governing productivity.
Figure 1 illustrates how one or two bond market equilibria can exist.10 The gure shows
credit supply (30) and demand (31), whereas both functions are multiplied by next periods
debt, bt. Thus, the gure shows the supplied and demanded volume of credit qtbt for all
possible realizations of at+1 (over the entire support of the productivity distribution). The
intersection of credit demand and supply determine the (future) productivity threshold
at+1 (and thus qtbt = qt	
 
at+1

). The gure shows three credit supply curves for di¤erent
10Note that the bond prices in this simplied model version hardly take realistic values due to the
extreme assumption of uniformly distributed productivity shocks.
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Figure 2: Bond prices in "low risk" and "high risk" equilibrium
tax rates (using  2 f0:2, 0:4, 0:55g; leaving credit demand for a xed government share
una¤ected), as well as a horizontal (dashed) credit demand line.
For the highest tax rate,  = 0:55, which implies a substantial average primary sur-
pluses, there exists exactly one bond market equilibrium within the feasible set of values
for the threshold at+1. The productivity threshold is close to the lower bound of the sup-
port, al, which implies a low equilibrium risk premium, since debt issued in t is already
sustainable at small productivity values t+1. For less extreme values of the tax rate (0:4
and 0:2), there exist two bond market equilibria, one with a low productivity threshold
close to the lower bound and one with a high productivity threshold close to the upper
bound, ah. The latter is obviously associated with a high risk premium, given that only
few productivity realizations in t+ 1 are su¢ ciently high to avoid default in t+ 1.
As gure 2 shows, the bond price qt at the "low risk" equilibrium decreases with
a higher stock of initially outstanding debt b 1 to gdp yt. In contrast, the bond price
in the "high risk" equilibrium increases with higher initial debt. Given this implausible
comparative static property of the high equilibrium rate, we will rst examine the lower
equilibrium interest rate in the subsequent analysis.11
11 In simulations, we found that realizations of the high equilibrium interest rate directly leads to default
(see Juessen et al., 2010).
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Table 1: Summary of parameter values
 (discount factor) 0.97
 (utility parameter) 0.332
g=y(a) (government share) 0.405
 (tax rate) 0.436
 (autocorrelation) 0.9
Implied output volatility 0.075
3.2 Quantitative results
In this section, we relax the simplications made in the previous section and solve the
model numerically for a more realistic parametrization. In particular, we move away
from the assumption of uniformly distributed productivity shocks that was only used for
analytical tractability above. While model periods are typically interpreted as quarters
in the business cycle literature, we deviate from this assumption and interpret one period
as a year, which facilitates computing theoretical predictions for government bonds with
one-year maturity (without considering multi-period bonds). Throughout the quantitative
analysis, we set the discount rate at  = 0:97 to match a standard average value for a
risk-free annual real interest rate and the mean working time share equal to l(a) = 1=3
(such that the utility parameter  is given by  = [(1  (g=y(a)))  l(a)] = (1  ).
As a point of departure, we consider a baseline scenario for the group of Euro-16
countries, i.e. for the 16 countries forming the Eurozone before Estonias accession. For
these countries, we calculate the average share of government spending in output g=y
using data from the European Commissions Annual Macroeconomic Database (AMECO)
over the period 1995-2009. Specically, we calculate g=y as the ratio of total current
expenditure (excluding interest payments) of the general government over gdp at current
market prices (thus, our measure of government expenditure includes transfers). For
the group of Euro-16 countries, the sample average is g=y = 0:405. For this g=y, we
set the tax rate  so that an initial debt-to-gdp ratio of 100% (b 1=y0 = 1) would be
sustainable in the absence of default risk and the risk-free interest rate being 1= (which
gives  = 1    + g=y(a)). This ensures that our model calibration does not violate the
transversality condition in the model.
We assume that productivity levels follow a rst order Markov process with an autocor-
relation of 0:9 and normally distributed innovations. To calibrate the standard deviation
of productivity shocks, we regress the log of annual real gdp for the Euro-16 countries
on a constant and a linear time trend, which avoids ltering out lower frequency output
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Figure 3: Multiple bond market equilibria
uctuations that might be relevant for debt dynamics and sovereign default.12 The es-
timated standard deviations of real output range from y = 3:9% for the Netherlands
to y = 15:7% for Greece, with an average of 7:5%. We choose the innovation vari-
ance in our model such that the realized standard deviation of logged demeaned output
from stochastically simulated model runs conforms with the average value over the output
standard deviations in our sample. Table 1 summarizes the parameter choices.
In our benchmark calibration, the debt repayment capacity 	t determined by (13)
is based on the surplus maximizing tax rate t = 0:5 + g= (2at). We compute the
value of 	t = Et
P1
k=0 
k c
 1
t+k
c 1t
st+k using simulation techniques, where c

t = c (at; 

t ) and
st = s (at; t ) denote consumption and surpluses as functions of the state and the state-
dependent surplus maximizing tax rate t . Specically, we draw time series of productivity
realizations for a sample length of 1,000 (conditional on the starting value at) and then
determine the associated sequences of consumption and surpluses using the decision rules,
taking into account the time-varying La¤er tax rates t . These series are used to ap-
proximate the innite sum of future discounted surpluses. We further approximate the
12Data on output (which are available over a longer time span than the tax and spending data) are from
AMECO and cover the longest available time period in each case, which is 1960-2008 for 11 out of the 16
countries, but shorter for Malta, Cyprus, Slovakia, Slovenia, and unied Germany.
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Figure 4: Interest rate spreads on government bonds, Rt  Rrft
conditional expectation by repeating this simulation 5,000 times and taking the mean over
all repetitions.
Below, we will also capture the case (that might arguably be relevant during the recent
debt crisis in Greece) that the government is believed not to be willing to increase taxes
to the surplus maximizing level in each period of time. This allows us to highlight the
quantitative implications of scenarios where investors base their expectations on tax rates
that are smaller than the La¤er curve maximizers, the latter being viewed as politically
infeasible.
Figure 3 shows the determination of bond market equilibria. Like in the simplied
model version (with uniformly distributed productivity shocks), we typically nd two
bond market equilibria: a "low risk" equilibrium at a high bond price and a "high risk"
equilibrium with a low bond price. Though the credit supply curve is almost at for the
low productivity threshold, it is in fact monotonically decreasing over the entire support.
We rst focus on the left equilibrium ("low risk") that exhibits intuitive comparative
static properties. Figure 4 shows the models implied bond pricing rule, i.e. the equilib-
rium relation between the interest rate spread of risky government bonds over the riskless
interest rate, Rt   Rrft , and the beginning-of-period ratio of debt to output for a given
productivity level.13 In the gure, the solid line displays risk premia when the current
13Appendix A.2 presents details on the computation of equilibrium bond prices.
19
state is at the mean productivity level (at = 1), while the dashed and dotted lines corres-
pond to lower productivity levels which reduce government surpluses and thus the debt
capacity and shift the equilibrium bond pricing rule to the left.
Figure 4 shows several key properties of the model for a parameterization intended
to capture the average EU country. First, sizeable risk premia on government bonds are
expected to emerge only at very high (and hitherto unobserved) debt-to-output ratios.
This is due to the fact that the maximum debt capacity is calculated using the surplus
maximizing tax rate, which is very high with a mean of just over 70%. Thus, the model
implies that to the extent that investors expect that the government is indeed able to tax at
the surplus maximizing rate if necessary, there is ample debt capacity such that risk spreads
would not occur at debt-to-gdp levels below 200%. This can be seen as characterizing the
situation in countries like France, Germany, or the Netherlands. Second, the gure shows
that a severe business cycle slump (as depicted by the dashed and dotted lines in the
gure), can lead to the emergence of risk premia as future surpluses are expected to be
small in this case. Third, the pricing curves tend to become very steep at high debt
ratios, suggesting that above a certain critical value that itself depends on the current
aggregate state of the economy even small further increases in debt can lead to rapidly
increasing risk spreads. The reason is that, if a high debt level is reached, not only would
any additional adverse shock lead to a high probability of partial default, but also the
endogenous repayment rate would be progressively smaller (see 15). Thus, the model
predicts that market participants may become extremely sensitive to changes in debt at
some point, and can thus be seen as an illustration of what may be called a rational market
panic.
We note, however, that this point is reached only at very high debt-to-gdp ratios
when the maximum debt capacity is based on t and when we focus on the equilibrium
with the lower of the possibly two bond interest rates, as we did in gure 4. However,
we have shown above that multiple equilibria may exist, which is also the case for the
parameterization chosen here. In gure 5, we add the second possible equilibrium risk
spread (shown by the bold lines), again for di¤erent values of the current aggregate state.
The gure shows that the existence of multiple equilibria implies that, depending on which
equilibrium materializes, risk spreads may di¤er by more than 10 percentage points (1,000
basis points). We interpret the existence of multiple equilibria as entailing the possibility
of self-fullling default expectations. A given debt-to-gdp ratio may imply low spreads if
investors coordinate their expectations on the low interest rate equilibrium, but may also
lead to extremely high spreads for the same fundamentals if investors command higher risk
premia due to bearish expectations. This opens up the possibility of explaining a sudden
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emergence of large risk premia as a "sunspot event", in which expectations may force
default since in the high interest rate equilibrium the scal stance becomes immediately
unsustainable.
Figure 6 shows the models implied bond pricing curves for the case that the tax rate
that investors use in computing the debt capacity falls short of the surplus maximizing tax
rate t . As mentioned above, the surplus maximizing tax rate has a mean of above 70%
in the model. This is much larger than empirically observed tax rates, such that it seems
reasonable to assume that investors might not believe the government to be able to raise
taxes to such a high level (the apparent di¢ culties of increasing tax rates experienced
by the current Greek government being a case in point). Figure 6 shows the relation
between debt-to-output ratios and risk spreads where 	t is based on tax rates that are
fractions of the mean surplus maximizing rate . Current productivity is assumed to
equal mean productivity in all cases. One can see that tax rates smaller than the La¤er
curve maximizer can dramatically shift the position of the bond pricing curve, because of
the implied reduction in the debt capacity. Thus, if expectations on the debt capacity are
based on smaller tax rates than the La¤er curve tax, high risk premia can emerge for much
lower levels of indebtedness, including those recently reached by many European countries.
This can be interpreted as an indication that investorscondence in the political ability of
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Figure 6: Spreads for di¤erent debt capacities (with current productivity at its mean)
the government may be crucial for the level of debt above which default risk becomes large.
Hence on top of the possibility of multiple equilibria this may be a second mechanism
which can tentatively explain why countries with similar debt-to-gdp ratios (like Spain
and Germany) experience large di¤erences in risk premia on government bonds.
4 Conclusion
This paper shows that risk premia on government bonds can be rationalized by lenders
unwillingness to roll over debt when outstanding public debt exceeds a governments debt
repayment capacity. The government does not commit to fully repay debt, such that
default occurs when the state of the economy worsens in a way that leads to a build-up
of public debt which exceeds the maximum present value of future surpluses. The default
risk premium on public bonds reects the probability of this event and the expected
rate of partial repayment in case of default. We have shown the possibility of multiple
equilibrium bond prices (i.e. a high and a low risk equilibrium), which can give rise to self-
fullling default expectations, since the probability of default depends on the scal burden
of interest payments, which themselves depend on the expected probability of default.
Considering the case where lenders expect the low equilibrium interest rate to prevail,
we have presented a calibrated version of the model to analyze its quantitative implic-
ations. The model predicts that above a critical debt ratio, risk premia begin to rise
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steeply, since market participants expect that further adverse business cycles shocks may
lead to a situation where the governments debt repayment capacity is exceeded. However,
for parameter values characterizing an average Eurozone member country, the model pre-
dicts negligible risk premia unless the government debt-to-gdp ratio rises beyond values
which have hitherto been observed. Large premia can, in the context of the model, be
explained either as a materialization of the high risk equilibrium, or as (unmodelled) polit-
ical constraints that make the surplus maximizing tax rate unfeasible, and thus restrict
the maximum debt capacity.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
To lighten the notation in this section, we drop the time index and dene b = bt, b 1 =
bt 1, a = at, a0 = at+1, and a = at+1. For a ! al, the RHS of (30) is given by
a log ah log alah al , which is the inverse of the risk-free rate R
rf = 1=

a log(ah=al)ah al

. Now
combine credit supply (30) with credit demand 1=R = (b 1   3a+ 4) =	(a) to get the
following condition for a:
b 1   (3a  4) =  a
ah   al f3 (a
   al)  4 (log a   log al) + 	 (a) (log ah   log a)g :
(32)
To examine the solution(s) for a, we dene F (a) as
F (a)   f3 (a   al)  4 (log a   log al) + 	 (a) (log ah   log a)g (b 1   (3a  4)) ;
where  =  aah al and solve for F (a
) = 0. At the lower bound of the support, F (a) is
given by F (al) = 1Rrf	(al)  (b 1   (3a  4)) implying that F (al) < 0 if credit demand
is su¢ ciently large
b 1   (3a  4) > 1
Rrf
	(al) : (33)
At the upper bound of the support, F (ah) satises F (ah) = a

3   log ah log alah al 4

+
3a   4   b 1, implying that F (ah) > 0 if credit demand does not exceed a particular
threshold
b 1   (3a  4) < a (1  )    1
Rrf
(1  ) g; (34)
where we used 3 = (1  )  and 4 = (1  ) g. Next, we examine the slope of F (a),
which is given by
F 0(a) =   (a) +  (log ah   log a) ; (35)
where the second term is strictly positive and decreasing in a and  (a) is dened as
 (a)  	(a) (3a 4)a	0(a) . Since feasible values of	(a) are positive, 	(a) = (1  ) (a 
g) + (1  ) a 1  (   g) > 0, we know that  (a) is also positive (since   ):
 (a) =
(1  ) (a   g)  (1  ) (a   g) + a (1  ) 1  (   g)
a (1  )  + a (1  ) 1  (   g)
> 0; (36)
and its derivative is strictly negative, 0 (a) =   g( )(1 )
a2(1 )( g) < 0. At the upper
bound, the derivative of F (a) equals F 0(ah) =   (ah) < 0 and is strictly negative.
For smaller values of a, the second term in (35) monotonically increases, while the rst
term,   (a), monotonically decreases. Hence, we know that F 0(a) = 0 cannot have
more than one solution, such that F (a) = 0 has either no, one, or two solutions for
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a 2 (al; ah). To assess the existence of two equilibria, we examine F (a) at its maximum,
which is characterized by F 0(ea) = 0) log ea = log ah    (ea), ea = ahe (ea) and
F (ea) = n3 ahe (ea)   al  4 (log ah   log al) +  (ea)4 +	ahe (ea)o
  (b 1   (3a  4)) :
I¤F (ea) > 0, (b 1   (3a  4)) < f3  ahe (ea)   al 4 (log ah   log al)+ (ea) [4+
	
 
ahe
 (ea)]g, there exists two equilibria. Given that e (ea) is increasing in ea and  (ea)
is decreasing in ea, we know that there exist two equilibria if but not only if
(b 1   (3a  4)) (37)
<
n
3

ahe
 (al)   al

  4 log(ah=al) +  (ah)

4 +	

ahe
 (al)
o
:
We can therefore conclude that there exists a unique equilibrium if (33) and (34) are
satised. When (33) is satised and (34) is violated, there exist two equilibria if but not
only if (37) is satised. 
A.2 Computation of equilibrium bond prices
We replace the original problem presented in section 2 by a discrete valued problem, i.e. we
assume that the models state space consists of a nite number of discrete points.14 We use
Tauchens (1982) algorithm to approximate the rst order Markov process for productivity
by a discrete-valued Markov chain. We provide the size of the interval Ia = [a1; an] and
the number of grid points, n (we use n = 401). Given the autocorrelation ; the interval
Ia is chosen to include 4 standard deviations of the productivity process. Tauchens
algorithm then delivers the exogenous state space of the model S = fa1; a2; :::; ang ; ai <
ai+1; i = 1; 2; :::; n  1, and the associated transition probability matrix P = (pij) ; whose
row i and column j element is the probability of moving from state ai state to state aj :
For a given combination of initial debt bt 1 and current productivity level at; the
equilibrium interest rate spread on government bonds is determined as follows:
 For a given current productivity level, at; current consumption ct = c (at) ; surpluses
st = s (at) ; and the maximum debt repayment capacity of the current period, 	t =
	(at) are computed with (19), (21), and (23). 	t is calculated using simulation
techniques as described in section 3.2, taking into account the time-varying tax
rates t . The risk-free rate is determined using R
rf
t = c
 1
t =
 
Etc
 1
t+1

, where the
conditional expectation Etc 1t+1 is computed by Etc(at+1)
 1 =
Pn
j=1 pij c (aj) 1 and
i denotes the index number for todays stochastic state, at:
14As an alternative to the discretization, one can solve the integrals in the asset pricing equation (25)
using numerical integration. Both approaches yield almost identical results.
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 Then, we check whether the government defaults in period t or not. If 	t < bt 1;
the government defaults, end-of-period debt equals zero, bt = 0; and there is no
borrowing. If 	t > bt 1, the government does not default in period t and the bond
market equilibrium price is determined as follows:
The bond market equilibrium consists of a price 1=Rt and end-of-period debt
bt. Replacing the integrals in (25) by sums over the nite number of states, the
asset pricing equation reads
bt 1   st
bt
=

c 1t
24b 1t Pat+1at+1=a1 t (at+1) hc (at+1) 1 s (at+1)i
+
Pan
at+1=at+1
t (at+1)
h
c (at+1)
 1
i 35 (38)
Use the updated version of (24) ; bt = 	
 
at+1

; to replace bt in (38) :
bt 1   st =
	
 
at+1


c 1t
24	  at+1 1Pat+1at+1=a1 t (at+1) hc (at+1) 1 s (at+1)i
+
Pan
at+1=at+1
t (at+1)
h
c (at+1)
 1
i 35 :
(39)
Equation (39) is then solved for the unknown productivity threshold in the next
period, at+1. The lower value at+1 equilibrium corresponds to the low interest
rate equilibrium (see the discussion on multiple equilibria in section 3.1).
Given the solution for at+1; next-periods debt level bt and the asset price 1=Rt
are determined by bt = 	
 
at+1

and
1
Rt
=

c 1t
24	  at+1 1Pat+1at+1=a1 t (at+1) hc (at+1) 1 s (at+1)i
+
Pan
at+1=at+1
t (at+1)
h
c (at+1)
 1
i 35
The risk premium on government bonds for given states bt 1 and at is calculated
as Rt  Rrft :
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